EU Member States'

Places of Refuge Table Top Exercise

'OCEAN TRAVELLER'

Port of Rotterdam
25 - 26 November 2013

EXERCISE REPORT

(April 2014)

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Abreviations used

CA	.... Competent Authority
CECIS	.... Common Emergency Communication and Information System (EC)
DG	.... Dangerous Goods
EC	.... European Commission
EMSA	.... European Maritime Safety Agency
ERCC	.... Emergency Response and Coordination Centre (EC)
HNS	.... Hazardous Noxious Substances
IMDG	.... International Maritime Dangerous Goods
MAR-CIS	.... Marine Chemical Information Sheets
MAR-ICE	.... Marine Chemical Emergency Information Service
MAS	.... Maritime assistance Service
MRCC	.... Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
MS	.... Member State
MSDS	.... Marine Safety Data Sheets
POLFAC	.... Pollution facilities
POLINF	.... Pollution information
POLWARN	.... Pollution warning
PoR	.... Place/s of Refuge
SITREP	.... Situation report
SSN	.... SafeSeaNet

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

The first meeting of the Co-operation Group on Places of Refuge took place in Brussels on 15 March 2013. During the meeting the Commission presented the developments in the transposition and implementation of Directive 2002/59/EC as amended by Directive 2009/17/EC, in relation to accommodation of ships in need of assistance. This meeting agreed that there was a need for continued co-operation in the practical implementation of the Directive and that the Cooperation Group was an important forum for facilitatingthis co-operation. EMSA was invited to convene a meeting of technical experts to consider some practical initiatives for enhanced co-operation between Member States.

The first meeting of the group of Member States' Technical Experts was held at the EMSA premisesin Lisbon on 15 May 2013. At that meeting, the Technical Experts agreed that a Table Top Exercise should be facilitated by EMSA, to allow Member States to share their experience of handling ships in need of assistance openly in a secure, anonymous environment. The Exercise would test the operation of the Places of Refuge provisions in Directive 2002/59/EC and identify strengths and weaknesses. An Exercise Planning Group was set up to organise the table top exercise.

The Netherlands and the Port of Rotterdam offered to host the exercise and dates were agreed with the Netherlands authorities. The Planning Group had a further two meetings at EMSA HQ on 12 August and 22 October 2013.

The exercise was held on 25 and 26 November 2013 at the World Port Centre Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

EXERCISE PLANNING GROUP

The management and planning team was composed of 11 persons as follows:

- Exercise Director – UK SOSREP
- Sponsor and logistics – EMSA
- Administration and communication – EMSA
- Coordination and host – The Netherlands/Port of Rotterdam
- Evaluation Lead – Malta assisted by UK

PARTICIPATION

The exercise was very well attended with 49 delegates fromBelgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Other delegates taking part included players from the Port of Rotterdam (being the refuge port), EMSA, EU Commission, International Group of P&I Clubs and the Salvage Industry. (Annex I - List of Participants)

AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of the exercise was:

- To test Directive 2002/59/EC in a worst case scenario in order to identify gaps, weaknesses and strengths

The objectives of the exercise were as follows:

- To give feedback to the Commission on any revision of Directive 2002/59/EC
- To provide a safe environment for learning and discussing Places of Refuge issues
- Review of reporting regimes and protocols for sharing and exchange of data and information between Member States
- Review of current SafeSeaNet protocols
- Review of MAR-ICE protocols
- Review of protocols for exchanging data following a Place of Refuge acceptance or refusal

- Testing of best practice against an exercise scenario
- To identify gaps, best practice and potential areas for improvement

THE EXERCISE

The exercise scenario was set in an area off the Dutch coast, but close to UK waters. It involved a collision between '*Bulk Loader'*, a fully laden Dutch tanker and the '*Ocean Traveller'*, a Panamanian container vessel with 7380 TEU, both bound for Rotterdam. Both vessels' owners appointed different salvors and therespective masters made the initial report to MRCC Den Helder, who in turn took responsibility to deal with the incident. The owners of the container vessel would be requesting a place of refuge while the tanker would go for an STS operation off the UK coast. (Annex II – Scenario)

Four syndicate groups were set up ensuring that there was an appropriate mix of expertise from the different regions,with each group having a facilitator. The exercise was divided into five serials spread over one and a half days as follows:

Day 1:

- Serial 1: Incident reporting and coordination
- Serial 2: HAZMAT information gathering
- Serial 3: Risk assessment and decision making

Day 2:

- Serial 4: Financial guarantees and liabilities
- Serial 5: Incident outside jurisdiction of any individual Member State

Each group broke out in separate rooms and was given time to work on common questions presented at plenary in between serials. Before the groups broke out for each serial, presentation/s on the related topic/s were given by the invited speakers to stimulate discussion at the breakout session. Each breakout session was allocated a time limit afterwhich all participants returned to plenary where feedback from the groups was presented and discussed. (Annex III – Exercise Programme)

PART 2

PROCEEDINGSAND FEEDBACK

Serial 1: Incident reporting and coordination

1	Initial Reporting & Coordination Who will take the lead for the SAR operation and on-going maritime incident?
2	Information Gathering What information will be required initially?
3	Mutual Support (a) Will assistance / assets be required from other MS / organisations? (b) What is the process for requesting that assistance / assets?
4	Member State Incident Reporting (a) What reports will need to be produced? (b) Who should they be sent to and by what method? (c) What format should be used for the reports?

1.1 There was a general concensus and it was logical that as the incident occurred in the Dutch SAR area and the initial reports were received by MRCC Den Helder, the Dutch Authorities were to coordinate and take responsibility for co-ordinating the response to the incident. Once this was treated as a SAR related emergency then the issue of maritime assistance had to be addressed. Although the incident occurred close to the UK SAR area, since it was inside the Dutch SAR area it did not alter the responsibility for coordination of the response. Furthermore Rotterdam was identified as a Place of Refuge for one of the vessels.

This matter though brought up an important issue as to which Authority was to deal with the incident; SAR or MAS Authority. This brought out the importance ofclearly distinguishingbetween the roles of the SAR and MAS Authorities.

Reporting may present some problems as initially reports may be made by telephone directly to either the Authorities, or at times to the vessel's agent. There have been cases where the ship owner has made direct arrangements with a salvor, who in turn has made direct contact with a port and has then been allocated refuge by a particular port, without the Competent Authority being initially contacted.

It is not widely understood that masters, owners and/or salvors have an obligation to obtain the relevant State's approval of their plans for dealing with a casualty and therefore they have an obligation to immediately alert the MRCC or MAS Authorities as soon as an incident occurs.

1.2 It was assumed that the SAR operation was completed and therefore the decision making process was about the handling of the two disabled vessels. It was evident that it was of the utmost importance that all necessary action had to be taken to keep the vessels afloat as this would minimise impact.

It appeared that authorities use similar criteria to decide on what steps are to be taken. The following is an indicative list:

- Ship's name, IMO number and flag
- Full details of shipowner, operator and if applicable salvor
- Evaluation of the ship's structural strength
- Damage stability criteria
- Cargo plan giving all the necessary information of the amount, type and stowage, with special emphasis on dangerous goods
- Type and quantity of any cargo or bunkers which have been dumped or released into the sea
- Weather information and forecasts
- Drift models for the oil/chemical spills and the ship itself

1.3 The request for assistance from neighbouring States would depend on the risk assessment and the possible escalation of the incident, which would determine if

this is necessary. The closest assets will be put on standby. This would be done through the Bonn Agreement (or other regional agreements) whilst also using SafeSeaNet (SSN) and the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) operated by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC formerly MIC) in Brussels. By using these systems, neighbouring States would be put on the alert immediately the incident is reported.

Regional agreements have their own protocol of how assistance is requested which compliments the use of CECIS through which EMSA chartered vessels and assets can be requested by a State.

1.4 All SITREPS should be in standard POLWARN, POLINF, POLREP, POLFAC formats; SSN and CECIS are to be kept updated with latest developments. It was evident that in some States different formats are used, because of national legislation. Information gathering should be undertaken by one source, which can then disseminate to other States and interested parties.

Serial 2: HAZMAT information gathering

1	Information Gathering What information is required?
2	Information Sources What mechanisms could be used to gather information on hazardous cargoes or potential risks from goods on board?
3	Technical Assistance What technical assistance is available from other non-ship/owner/operator sources?

2.1 All the information regarding the dangerous goods on board the vessels should be obtained immediately. Without this information it would be very difficult to make a risk assessment. Container vessels could have large quantities of dangerous goods on board which can be as much as 20% of the cargo, while product and chemical tankers could have a variety of oil products very hazardous chemicals.

Following is a non-exhaustive list of information which would be required:

- Correct technical name and UN number in accordance with the IMDG Code of packaged cargoes
- Type of oil or HNS cargo on board accompanied by the relative MSDS
- Quantities of dangerous goods
- Contents of lost containers or oil/HNS in the water
- Stowage plan of showing the vessel's original state upon departure of last port
- Tank capacities
- Cargo manifest
- Quantities and type of goods lost overboard and eventual reaction with other cargoes. Specific goods which may interact with water and/or other products are to be properly indicated
- Vessel's general arrangement plan showing areas where hull is breached

2.2 There are various ways of how to obtain information. The main sources of information are:

- Vessel' pre-arrival notification as both vessels were bound for Rotterdam such information should already be available
- SSN
- MAR-CIS
- MAR-ICE
- Product MSDS
- Ship's local agent
- Classification society
- Salvors

2.3 There was general consensus that manifests and DG lists do not always give the real picture and there is a possibility that there could be undeclared items and that the contents of some of the containers may be also underdeclared.

Various sources were identified wherefrom technical assistance could be obtained. The following main sources were identified:

- Specialised teams from salvors
- Aerial surveillance with infra red equipment
- Hydrographic institutes and meteorological offices
- Inspections by competent authority team/s
- Survey reports from classification society

Serial 3:Place of Refuge risk assessment and decision making process

1	National & Regional Plans (a) What steps need to be followed to identify a potential place of refuge? (b) Are the adjacent MS's Plans available to you 24/7?
2	Information Gathering What information is required prior to a decision being taken & how will it be gathered?
3	Coordination (a) Who will co-ordinate the information & who should it be shared with? (b) Can responsibilities be shared between competent authorities and how might these authorities maintain contact with each other during the incident?
4	Place of Refuge Refusal You have been requested by the salvor to provide a place of refuge. What action

	will you take if, following your risk assessment, the decision is taken by the competent authority not to grant/accept the ship as it is not deemed to be the best course of action for the purposes of the protection of human health or the environment?

3.1 Places of refuge plans should be in line with IMO A949 guidelines. Some States did not see the importance of making the plans public as most of them are written in the national language and would be of no use to other States having different languages.

Most of the plans are on the national websites but as indicated some could be in the national language, so it was agreed that the 24/7 contact details of the competent authority should be made widely available and circulated especially with the neighbouring States.

A place of refuge is identified on an ad-hoc basis, as this would depend on the type and seriousness of the incident. A place of refuge could be a just sheltered anchorage, or a safe berth within a port.

Each plan should identify the various places that could be used and, following the risk assessment, the decision makers would then decide on the best place to put the vessel.

Both national and regional plans should be consulted before a decision is taken.

3.2 Prior to a final decision, a risk assessment should be conducted from all the available information already accessibleat the beginning of the incident. During the assessment there could be the need to obtain further information, but the plan should contain guidelines on what information is needed and by whom it is to be provided.

Information can be obtained from P&I Club, vessel's Classification Society, the Owner and the Salvor and from other reliable sources.

A risk assessment methodology should be in place to expedite decision making and the risk assessment is to address technical, legal, environmental and human issues.

3.3 The overall responsibility for the coordination of the incident rests with the national designated authority in accordance with Article 20 and is not to be shared with other States but is to be handled by one State. Decision making could be shared with local stakeholders, as this is within national competence. Responsibilities cannot be shared with other competent authorities - if the incident moves into another jurisdiction, then a transfer of responsibility is to be undertaken, with a proper documented procedure.

3.4 If refuge is refused, clear reasons should be given to the owner/salvor, giving an indication of the circumstances which have led to the refusal. The owner/salvor may be requested to review the situation and maybe asked to take remedial action unless the decision is final.

If the decision is final then it is to be communicated accordingly also to the neighbouring states.

Serial 4: Financial guarantees and liability

	Additional Information *Following the assessment process on both ships as the competent authority(s) you have agreed to provide a place(s) of refuge but have just been advised that the container vessel does not have a valid insurance certificate in accordance with Article 6 of Directive 2009/20/EC.*
1	What impact will this information have on your decision to grant the places of refuge for: (a) the container ship in the Port of Rotterdam? (c) the tanker preparing for a STS transfer in a safe anchorage close to the UK coast?

4.1 One has to establish why no such cover exists as the vessel has already called at an EU port, therefore the vessel should have the necessary liability cover in accordance with Directive 2009/20/EC. According to this Directive the shipowners have to show the evidence of insurance cover, normally requested prior to a vessel is cleared to enter a port.

4.2. There is a comprehensive list of international conventions that apply to potential liability and provide for rules on compensation regarding various types of maritime claims and can be also applied to a place of refuge situation.

- International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 (CLC Convention)
- International Oil Pollution Fund 1992 (IOPC Fund) &Supplementary Fund 2003
- International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 (Bunkers' Convention)
- International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1996 (HNS Convention) – not yet in force
- The Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007 – not yet in force
- Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 & 1996 (LLMC)

4.3. Any issues not defined by the international conventions are subject to national laws. In the present case we expect Dutch and English law to apply.

Serial 5: Initial incident outside the jurisdiction of any Member State

1	What would be different if the incident occurred in a position outside the jurisdiction of any individual EU Member State? Consider coordination, reporting, risk assessment and financial guarantees.

5.1 At first, it seemed logical that the CA of the closest coast or port should be responsible for incident co-ordination, at least in the first instance. However, there were various divergences on this matter as it was difficult to establish who should take initial responsibility; would it be the CA of a MS which has jurisdiction of:

- SAR, MRCC, MAS area?
- EEZ area?
- State of destination port which could have been agreed to by the salvor? But what if it is a totally different region?
- Flag State? But what if a non-EU flag and/or from a different region?

Other considerations raised by participants included the fact that owners or salvors may have entered into agreement with a particular shipyard or terminal in a particular port. What if the CA of that particular port would not allow the vessel in its waters?

PART 3

LESSONS LEARNT

1. Incident reporting and coordination

i. Important to immediately report the incident and make clear the relevant obligations of the master, owner and salvor.

ii. All the information is necessary to assess the dangers associated with the casualty and whether it is safe to allocate refuge. In such a situation it is imperative to have direct contact with the person/s responsible for the salvage operation and for the vessel itself.

iii. Some MS do not make use of SSN. Therefore there are to be national provisions for use of the system as it has shown that there is a lot of information which can be used if the system is used properly and frequently.

iv. It transpires that also within the EC itself there could be differences in reporting formats in the different reporting systems. This is to be looked into keeping in mind national legislation and regional agreements and protocols. It would be ideal if all reporting formats are harmonised.

2. HAZMAT information gathering

i. Having the correct technical name and UN number of DG's is an important and key factor as without the correct information it would be almost impossible to determine the impact that such an incident would have. It is a known fact that with today's size and capacity of the modern container vessels, which may be carrying up to 14,000 containers; it is very difficult to obtain correct information regarding the contents of the containers themselves.

ii. Worst case scenarios are to be looked into in the case when there would be a number of mixed DG's which may not be compatible with each other, keeping in mind that apart from reaction with each other there are some which are dangerous when wet. MAR-CIS and MAR-ICE were not widely used and a small number of States do not use SSN for such incidents. Information sometimes is not readily available and obtaining the correct information is very time consuming. Use of all available systems and data bases is to be widely encouraged. MS are to look into how it is best to implement such provisions.

iii. Information sharing between MS is important as the location of the threat moves. Precise information on what is on board and what was lost at sea is vital for assessing the risks involved and to decide if a PoR is allocated or not. There is a need to work together and share all the necessary information. Sharing of information may be very complex if more than one State is involved as national legislation has to be taken into consideration.

3. Risk assessment and decision making process

i. The PoR plans need not be circulated but it is essential that the CA's 24/7 contact details are widely available as it is the only way that one can expedite matters.

ii. It may prove difficult to obtain the necessary information from the owner. The IMO guidelines do not give a quick decision making process so one

has to ensure that this is addressed in the plan. The quicker information is gathered the quicker can the decision be taken.

iii. Responsibility and coordination is not to be shared with other CA but is to remain strictly of national competence. The risk assessment is to also include the possibility of not allocating refuge and the impact that such a decision may have. This way one can compare the risks involved and maybe then apply the NEBA process. If the incident moves to another jurisdiction then the transfer of responsibility with a proper documented procedure is to be undertaken. There was a general consensus that it was important to share as much information as possible between CA's to avoid duplication of work and expedite decision making.

iv. There were various views on the sharing of the decision making process with other CA's. Most agreed that the decision making process was not to be shared as this could contain sensitive information of national competence which solely relates to that State. It was generally agreed that other relevant information related to the incident itself may be shared with other CA's.

There is also another option; that of sinking the vessel in deeper waters, although that could be subject to other legal constraints.

4. Financial guarantees and liabilities

i. Although insurance cover for various maritime claims is required under Directive 2009/20/EC for all ships entering EU ports, there is no obligation as such to ask for confirmation in the pre-arrival notification. This has to therefore be tackled by the individual MS.

ii. Special pollution damage like oil pollution damage or damage by hazardous and noxious substances is regulated separately and it is out of scope of the Directive 2009/20/EC. A special insurance is required and additional compensation mechanisms are provided for in the international conventions. It depends on each Member State to ratify those conventions and to effectively implement their rules into national law.

iii. A proof of cover can be requested from the shipowner when the place of refuge is sought. In such situation MS should immediately liaise with the vessel's insurer regarding the cover of actual or anticipated direct and third-party claims. Liability limits are to be verified and regardless of financial guarantees risk assessments have still to be made.

iv. There could be an issue when a Coastal State directs a vessel to proceed to a PoR to avoid further pollution or to mitigate the disaster. In such a circumstance it could be difficult for the State to request financial guarantees. If on the other hand the master, owner or salvor request a PoR then the State should ask for the necessary guarantees.

v. Lack of financial liability cover may be an issue in some southern EU MS or in the Baltic states where there are a number of non EU flag vessels crossing Baltic or Mediterranean without entering EU ports – therefore they are not bound by the Directive 2009/20. Such vessels might at some point request a place of refuge without being originally trading or calling at an EU port and such vessels might not have insurance cover.

vi. It is very difficult to allow a vessel in national waters if no liability cover exists. Directive 2009/17 provides that "the absence of an insurance certificate (…) shall not exonerate a Member State from the preliminary assessment (…), and shall not in itself be considered sufficient reason for a Member State to refuse to accommodate a ship in a place of refuge. "However, one has to keep inmind that most ports (potential places of refuge) today are operated privately and no port would want disruption of business or loss of profits. On the otherhand one has to consider the impact if the vessel is left out at sea. According to the Directive 2009/17 "The authority (….) shall ensure that ships are admitted to a place of refuge if they consider such an accommodation the best course of action for the purposes of the protection of human life or the environment."

5. Initial incident outside jurisdiction of any MS

i. It is very clear that this is an issue which needs further discussion between the MS as it is very difficult to have a clear cut answer in view of the different areas of jurisdiction and regionality of the different MS.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A list of Competent Authorities is to be drawn up and accessed by CA's which can be password protected with restricted access.

2. A cooperation working group with sub-groups is to be set up.

3. Member States are to make available their own PoR decision making methodology.

4. Similar exercises in different regions are to be organised.

5. PoR decision making methodology is to be available.

6. Contact details of CA and responsible persons for initial incident reporting are to be available and kept updated.

7. A Code of Practice or Guidelines on the similar lines of the Claims Management Guidelines together with a standardised risk assessment methodology are to be developed.

8. When an incident occurs outside the jurisdiction of any State the initial handling of the incident becomes a very complex matter. This matter is to be looked into and discussed with the MS for a best way forward.

It is also recommended that any working groups are facilitated by EMSA.

Note:

This report could not have been possible without the valuable input of all the participants, the Planning Team and the Group Facilitators.

ANNEX I – List of Participants

SG	Name	MemberState	Organisation	Exercise Role
2	GYSSENS, Rejane	Belgium	Flemish Gouverment	Player
1	PELS, Alain	Belgium	MOW / MDK / Pilotage	Facilitator
3	DEPOORTER, Pascal	Belgium	Coast Guard Secretariat	Player
2	PETROV, Zhivko	Bulgaria	Bulgarian Maritime Administration	Player
EV	DZHAMBAZOV, Valentin	Bulgaria	Bulgarian Maritime Administration	Evaluation
2	DUNDOVIA, Damian	Croatia	MRCC Rijeka	Player
2	HADJICHRISTO, Christos	Cyprus	CyprusRotterdam Consultant	Player
1	CHRISTENSEN, Akel Moeller	Denmark	Admiral Danish Fleet	Player
4	ORRO, Mart	Estonia	Estonian Police and Border Guard Board	Player
2	VAISANEN, Jukka	Finland	Finnish Transport Agency	Player
3	ERLUND, Thomas	Finland	Finnish Transport Agency	Facilitator
4	LEPPANEN, Petteri	Finland	Ministry of the Interior / Border and Coast Guard	Player

4	BABKINE, Michel	France	SG Mer	Facilitator
1	DENAMUR, Vincent	France	Maritime Safety Division / Directorate Maritime Affairs	Player
2	EVAIN, Maurice	France	Adjoint au Commandant du port de Dunkerque	Player
3	SOREL, Eric	France	Commandant adjoint du port de Dunkerque	
4	THOUAILLE, Charles Henri	France	Le Prefecture Maritime du Cherbourg	Player
1	KOEHLER, Peter	Germany	CCME	Guest Speaker
1	CHARALAMPOS, Psychogyios	Greece	Ministry of Shipping / Maritime Affairs	Player
4	MANGIDAS, Konstantinos	Greece	Hellenic Coast Guard	Player
1	REYNOLDS, Chris	Ireland	Coastguard	Player
2	BARRY, Hugh	Ireland	Coastguard	Facilitator
4	GABRIELE, Peschiulli	Italy	Ministry of Environment	Player
2	SKRIBIS, Andris	Latvia	MRCC Riga / Coastguard	Player
3	ULOZAS, Alfridas	Lithuania	Maritime Safety Administration	Player
3	BUGEJA, David	Malta	Transport Malta	Player
EV	GABRIELE, Richard	Malta	Transport Malta	Evaluation

4	KALATA, Andrzej	Poland	Maritime Office Gdynia	Player
1	BUCURESTEANU, Dumitru	Romania	Romanian Naval Authority	Player
3	HANZEN, Ronnie	Sweden	Swedish Transport Agency	Player
2	MIEDEMA, Gerrit	The Netherlands	Netherlands Coastguard	Player
3	GUTTELING, Rob	Port of Rotterdam	Port of Rotterdam	Player
4	VAN VOELEN, Frans	The Netherlands	Port of Rotterdam	Guest Speaker
DS/ EV	HUISMAN, Johannes	The Netherlands	Rijkswaterstaat Zee & Delta	Distaff
4	VAN HOLK, Alexander	The Netherlands	Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment	Player
1	VISSER, Michiel	The Netherlands	RWS Netherland	Player
3	KOFFEMAN,Geert	The Netherlands	Koffeman Consult	Guest Speaker
EV	STEVENS, Dominic	United Kingdom	UK SOSREP Support	Evaluation
4	BOLOMINI, David	United Kingdom	IGP&I	Guest Speaker
2	WOZNICKI, Stan	United Kingdom	Maritime & Coastguard Agency	Player
4	COLCOMB, Kevin	United Kingdom	Maritime & Coastguard Agency	Player
DS	SHAW, Hugh	United Kingdom	UK SOSREP	Ex Director

3	LLORENSINGLES, Francisco Javier	Spain	Direccion General de la Marina Mercante	Player
DS	CROSSLEY, Theresa	EMSA	EMSA	Ex Sponsor
DS	NESTEROWICZ, Malgorzata	EMSA	EMSA	Distaff
DS	NORDHAUSEN, Walter	EMSA	EMSA	Guest Speaker
DS	ZABKOWSKI, Julian	EMSA	EMSA	Logistics
1	TSAROUCHA, Lemonia	EU Commission	COM	Observer
3	AVINO, Michele	EU Commission	COM	Observer
			Total Participants	49

ANNEX II - Scenario

On 22nd of November 2013 around 05:40 UTC in the position 52° North and 002°.45 East the fully laden Dutch flag tanker mv **"BULK LOADER"** collided with the 7380 TEU Panamanian flag container vessel **"OCEAN TRAVELLER"**.

The tanker was bound for Rotterdam from the anchorage off the coast of Lowestoft, whereas the container vessel came from Edinburgh also bound for Rotterdam.Thecause of the collision is under investigation.

Conditions at sea where good, with south-westerly winds Beaufort 4 to 5; poor visibility. Both vessels according to AIS information maintained a considerable speed. The tanker has damage on the portside where she was hit at the accommodation and it appeared that the cofferdam was also severely damaged, obviously the double hull was fully penetrated and two wing tanks and a centre tank suffered damage. About 6000 tonnes of oil have escaped into the environment.

With regard the container vessel first reports indicated heavy damage to the bow with effects to first cargo holds. Fire broke out in cargo hold 2 and about 20 containers were reported lost overboard.

Personnel effected

BULK LOADER: one person lost his life, three crew had injuries.
OCEAN TRAVELLER: reported six injured crew, two of them had a broken leg.

Weather prediction

The meteorological conditions are expected to rapidly change as a low pressure area moves quickly from south to north, resulting in veering winds towards the west increasing to Beaufort 8 possibly 9.

Salvage

Owners of the **BULK LOADER** have appointed Svitzer Salvage as the salvor and entered into LOF 2011 Contract.

Owners of the **OCEAN TRAVELLER** have appointed SMIT Salvage as the salvor and have also entered into LOF 2011.

NOTE: Initially both Masters report the collision to MRCC DEN HELDER

Exercise area





ANNEX III – EXERCISE PROGRAMME

DAY 1: Monday 25 November, 2013

08:45-09:15	Registration
09:15-09:35	STARTEX.Welcome, Introduction, objectives and exercise briefing. Domestic arrangements – Port of Rotterdam Theresa Crossley, EMSA
09:40-10:20	**Serial 1 : Incident Reporting and Coordination** Syndicate Groups
10:25-10:55	**Serial 1 : Syndicate Group Feedback** Plenary Session
10:55 – 11:15	Coffee break
11:15- 11:45	**Serial 2 : HAZMAT Information Gathering** Syndicate Groups
11:45 – 12:10	**Serial 2 : Syndicate Group Feedback** Plenary Session
12:15 - 12:30	Presentation **2** - Accessing & Assessing MAR – ICE Info Speaker: Walter Nordhausen, EMSA

12:30 -13:15	Lunch
13:15 -14:00	**Serial 3 : Risk assessment and decision making** Syndicate Groups

14:00 -14:40	**Serial 3 : Syndicate Group Feedback** Plenary Session
14:40 – 14:55	Presentation **3**– Regional Cooperation Speaker: Peter Koehler, Havariekommando, GE
15:00 – 15:15	Presentation**4** – Role of the Salvor and Classification Society Speaker: Geert Koffeman, Independent Consultant
15:20-15:50	Presentation **5**- Role of the Harbour Authorities Speaker: Mr Frans van Zoelen, Port of Rotterdam
16:00-16:30	Plenary Discussion / Hot Issues Day 1 / Domestic Arrangements Dinner
16:45	Day 1 Exercise Close.

DAY 2: Tuesday 26 November, 2013

09:00-09:15	Day 2 Opening Remarks Theresa Crossley, EMSA
09:15 – 09:45	**Serial 4 : Financial Guarantees & Liability** Syndicate Groups
09:45 – 10:15	**Serial 4 : Syndicate Group Feedback** Plenary Session
10:20- 10:40	Presentation **6** – Financial Guarantees and Liabilities Speaker: David Bolomini, IGP&I, London
10:40 -11:00	Coffee break

11:00 – 11:15	**Serial 5: Incident outside jurisdiction of any individual MS** Syndicate Groups
11:15 – 11:30	**Serial 5 : Syndicate Group Feedback** Plenary Session
11:30 – 12:30	**Hot Debrief** Plenary Session : Richard Gabriele, Exercise Evaluation Lead, Malta
12:30 – 13:00	Closing Remarks / Way Forward – Theresa Crossley ENDEX