DNV·GL

MARITIME



EMSA OP/10/2013

A STUDY ASSESSING THE ACCEPTABLE AND PRACTICABLE RISK LEVEL OF PASSENGER SHIPS RELATED TO DAMAGE STABILITY

08 September 2015



Content

- Introduction and overview of the EMSA III studies (Odd Olufsen)
- Formal Safety Assessment, Risk Models for collision and grounding (Rainer Hamann)
- Methodologies for assessing risk from watertight doors and risk from grounding (Odd Olufsen)
- Sample ships; design and risk control options (Henning Luhmann)
- Summary of results, recommendations for decision making (Odd Olufsen)

- Shipyards:
 - EUROYARDS, representing: Meyer Werft, Fincantieri, Meyer Turku, STX-France
- Designers/Consultants:
 - Knud E. Hansen AS & Safety at Sea
- Operators:
 - Carnival Cruise, Color Line, Royal Caribbean & Stena Line
- Universities:
 - National Technical University of Athens, University of Strathclyde & University of Trieste
- Software developer:
 - Napa OY
- Classification Society:
 - DNV GL

Background

- Passenger ships transport significant numbers of persons compared to cargo ships
- Therefore, safety of persons on board is in focus in passenger ship design
- The main risk contributors for passenger ships are accidents leading to loss of water tightness, i.e. collision, contact and grounding
- Currently designed ships need to comply with SOLAS 2009 probabilistic damage stability requirements
- SOLAS 2009, to a great extent, was based on research work of the HARDER project
- When introducing SOLAS 2009, the level of R was based on the safety level of the current fleet.

Overview of completed tasks in the EMSA III project



Defined tasks and their main elements

Task 1:

Acceptable and practicable risk level of passenger ships

-risk level in comparison with other transport modes

-updated collision risk model

-risk control options(rco) and cost benefit assessment(cba)

-recommending level of the required index R

Task 2:

Evaluation of risk from watertight doors

-collecting records; onboard monitoring cruise and RoPax

-parametric model reflecting number, categorisation and closing time of wtd

-parametric model developed and used to assess risk on the sample ships

-rco and cba carried out for some sample ships

Task 3:

Evaluation of risk from grounding

-updated damage statistics and grounding risk model including contact damages

-side and bottom grounding damage statistics

-NAPA software developed for direct generation of hull breaches from statistics

-attained index for grounding damages

-calculations of A carried out on all sample ships

-rco and cba carried out for some sample ships

Task 4: Combined assessment of cost effectiveness of previous parts, FSA compilation and overall recommendation for decision making.

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- In 2002 IMO agreed that adjustment/development of regulations should be prepared using risk analysis (-> Formal Safety Assessment Guidelines)
- Goals of this study:

could damage stability requirements of passenger ships be increased

following FSA process

- This study considers
 - Passenger ships: cruise, passenger, RoPax and RoPax-Rail
 - Ships in compliance with current damage stability requirements (reference)

FSA₁

- FSA was developed to support IMO decision making by helping to evaluate regulatory changes in terms of benefits and related costs.
- FSA should provide recommendations for decision making
- FSA
 - Comprises a complete risk assessment
 - Hazard identification
 - Risk assessment
 - Risk reduction measures
 - Cost-benefit assessment
 - Reporting
 - Suggests required safety level to be tolerable and ALARP



Ungraded

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ALARP = As Low As Reasonable Practical

Tolerable and ALARP

- Tolerable and ALARP means
 - That risk is not intolerable (-> risk reduction without cost-benefit assessment)
 - ALARP process is applied
- ALARP process:
 - Measures reducing risk (frequency, consequence or both) are identified/developed
 - Measures are assessed with respect to benefits (safety, economic) and costs by
 - Risk reduction is quantified
 - Costs of risk reduction measures are determined
 - Measures are assessed in terms of cost/risk reduction ratio and a criterion specified in FSA Guidelines

ALARP = As Low As Reasonable Practical

ALARP process

- FSA guidelines provide criteria for cost benefit assessment
 - Gross cost of averting a fatality (GCAF) $GCAF = \frac{\Delta Cost}{\Delta Risk}$
 - Net cost of averting a fatality (NCAF) $NCAF = \frac{\Delta Cost \Delta Benefit}{\Delta Risk}$
 - An RCO is cost beneficial if GCAF/NCAF are equal to or lower than threshold
- Threshold for GCAF and NCAF provided by FSA Guidelines (\$3 million)
- Threshold were determined by means of specified process using social indicators (not static, follows general development)
- The value given in FSA Guidelines was suggested in 1999 (MSC 72/16) considering social indicators until 1988
- In GOALDS project threshold was updated to \$7.45 million
- In this study \$4 and \$8 million has been used.

EMSA III study



Development of risk model

- Analysis of casualty reports to determine main events characterising risk
 - Develop high-level event sequence
- Analysis of accident statistics to specify representative sample

Development of annual accident frequencies

- Select/review casualty reports
- Develop risk model, e.g. in form of event tree
- Quantify risk model
 - Initial accident frequency
 - Dependent probabilities
 - Numerical model
 - Historical data
 - Expert judgement

- Basis:
 - IHS Fairplay casualty database and ship register
 - Lloyds Maritime Investigation Unit database (LMIU)
 - Global Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS)
- Sample characteristics of ships
 - Built after 1981
 - ≥ 1000 gross tonnage
 - ≥ 80 m
 - IACS class at time of accident/today
 - No High Speed Crafts

Fleet size





Casualties RoPax



Casualty database

- Basis for this study formed the casualty database developed in GOALDS project extended by reports after 2009
- All records were reviewed and populated accordingly
- By review process casualty reports not relevant for this study were identified and not further considered
- Initial casualty information is coming from IHS database. This information was enhanced from other sources especially in cases where accident investigating reports were available (e.g. GISIS)
- Only casualties considered complying with filtering criteria (ship size, year built etc.)

ID 427 IMO Vessel Name		Subtype			Source
		Class Info			
Due or Scrap or Delivered Year Loss Year	Status	Classed By		Cla	IACS
Loa (m) DWT:	Class Society	Class At Time Of Incident		Cla	IACS
		Number of	Person	s On Board	Lorries/Trailers
Lbp (m): Dupd (n		Passengers	Crew	Number	Cars TEU
Bmld (m): Draught (n	1):		_		
Dbhd (m):			Passengers berthed	Passengers unberthed	Froude
Incident Casual Number	у		Presic Text 1		
Incident Date	Marsden Grid				
Incident Severity	Start Latitude Start Longitude		Presic Text 2		
Total Loss	Location		Text 2		
Number of Killed	Type Info				
Number of Missing	Veather At Time		Compl.		
	Of Incident		text 1		
Struck/Striking Water Ingress	Sinking In	fo	ı L		
Info Info	Fire Inf	io	Compl.		
Navigation Sea bottom Info Info	Staying Agr Info	ound	text 2		

Risk Model

- For the purpose of this study two risk models were developed for accident categories
 - Collision
 - Grounding (+ contact)
- Only consequences with respect to persons on board are in focus
- Quantitative risk model developed using Event Tree method
- Ship type dependent risk models were developed separately for cruise and RoPax, in order to considering particularities, e.g. for
 - Initial accident frequencies
 - Fatality rates
- Risk models are ship size dependent, with respect to
 - Number of person on board
 - Probability of sinking

Risk Model: Collision



- High-level event sequence for collision casualties of passenger ship
 - Considers main factors influencing the risk to persons on board



- Initiator: Struck/striking
 - Small number of casualty reports providing sufficient information for quantifying nodes of risk model
 - Therefore, in the view of reducing uncertainty, casualty reports for cruise and RoPax were merged
 - On average struck/striking probability is about 50% (struck: 43% cruise, 58% RoPax)
 - Analysis of casualty reports showed that collision accident damages are only relevant for ship stability when ship is struck

Risk Model: Quantification

- Operational area
 - Extent of hull damage heavily relates to impact energy which depends on ship speed and mass
 - In terminal area extent of hull damage is smaller than for collision in open sea or coastal





- Location of the breach, i.e. is water ingress possible
- By distinguishing two operational areas the model considers the differences between operation in terminal areas and others:
 - Probability of water ingress in terminal areas is about 7% (based on 14 casualty reports)
 - Probability of water ingress in other areas is about one third (based on six reports)
 - Quantification was based on casualty reports merging cruise and RoPax ships

- Probability of sinking
 - Is determined on basis of SOLAS 2009 damage stability requirements
 - Probability of sinking equal to 1 minus attained index (A-Index)
- Consequences
 - Related to persons on board (crew + passengers)
 - Considering occupancy of 90% for cruise, respectively seasonal occupancy for RoPax (100% for 12.5% of the year, 75% for 25% of the year and 50% for remaining time)
 - Two representative fatality rates used for the scenarios
 - Fast sinking/capsizing 80% of persons on board
 - Slow sinking 5% of persons on board
 - For sinking in terminal areas 5% fatality rate used for all scenarios

Probability of fast sinking depends on ship type (18% for cruise, 50% for ungrad RoPax)

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

Operationa Area

Water Ingres

Sinking

Initiator

Collision



Risk Model: Grounding



of passenger ship

- Contact casualties with potential of penetrating hull and subsequent water ingress
- Only consequences with respect to persons on board are in focus

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6

Operational State

Damage

Risk Model: Quantification

Initial accident frequency

accident frequency			Staying
	Ti	me Period	Aground Hull Breach
	20	000 - 2012	
	casualties	1/ship year	Sinking Consequences
		Cruise	
	20 + 22	1.57E-02	
		RoPax	
	27 + 86	2.12E-02	

Grounding

Risk Model: Quantification

- Operational state
 - Considering that scenarios will differ between accidents in terminal areas and other areas, e.g. with respect to possibility of rescue but also water depth
 - About 57% of accidents occurred in terminal areas (217 reports for period 1990 to 2012)
- Damage location
 - Distinguishing between side and bottom damage
 - For terminal areas about 92% are side damages (75 casualty reports)
 - For other areas about 51% are bottom damages (43 casualty reports)

Level 2

Damage

Location

Operationa

State

Grounding

Level 3

Staying Aground Level 4

Hull Breach

Level 5

Sinking

Level 6

Consequences



Risk Model: Quantification

- Probability of sinking
 - Is determined on basis of the new developed model
 - Similar to collision the probability of survival is expressed in terms of an index (A_{GR} -Index)
- Consequences
 - Related to persons on board (crew + passengers)
 - Considering occupancy of 90% for cruise, respectively seasonal occupancy for RoPax (100% for 12.5% of the year, 75% for 25% of the year and 50% for remaining time)
 - Two representative fatality rates used for the scenarios
 - Fast sinking/capsizing 80% of persons on board
 - Slow sinking 5% of persons on board
 - For sinking in terminal areas 5% fatality rate used for all scenarios
- Probability of fast sinking depends on ship type (18% for cruise, 50% for RoPax)



Hull Breach

Sinkina

Consequences

Staying Aground

Operational

State

Damage

Location

Grounding



- Risk models are used to determine risk reduction by increased damage stability
- Risk models are based on experience and numerical models
- For cost-benefit assessment so-called cost thresholds were calculated by means of risk models, i.e. calculating risk reduction (difference between A-Indices of reference and novel design) and monetary value per avoided fatality

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The effect of open watertight doors



Vcn / VDM

Methodologies for assessing risk from watertight doors

 A parametric model that can be used for assessing risk from watertight doors has been developed:

$$r^{*} = \frac{A^{*}_{opened}}{A^{*}_{closed}} = 1 - b * \frac{V_{cnall}}{V_{DH}} \qquad b = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_{door}} P_{WTD\,i} * c(t_{i}) * V_{cn\,i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n_{door}} V_{cn\,i}}$$

	R124.0	R134.0	R144.0
R123		R133	R143
	R122	R132	R142
	R121	R131	R141
R1181201	T92	T96 R130R	140 T10

Door	Description of category	Probability that a door is	Time to close the
Category		open at a certain point of	door, t _i
		time P _{WTD i}	
Α	Door permitted to stay	100%	5 minutes
	open at sea		
В	Door which may be	60%	3 minutes
	opened during work in		
	the vicinity of the door		
С	Door which may be used	11%	1 minute
	to pass through		
D	Door which is always	0%	0 minute
	closed – this is proposal		
	of a new door category		

Methodology for assessing survivability from grounding

Probabilistic method for grounding.pptx
Sample ships, Risk Control Options and Cost Benefit Assessment

- Introduction and overview of the EMSA III studies (Odd Olufsen)
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EMSA3 Sample ships and design teams



Yard/Design er	Туре	Length bp (m)	В (m)	T (m)	GT	Number of persons
MW	Large cruise	294.6	40.8	8.75	153400	6730
Fincantieri	Small cruise	113.7	20.0	5.30	11800	478
Meyer Turku	Baltic RoPax	232.0	29.0	7.20	60000	3280
STX-France	Med RoPax	172.4	31.0	6.60	43000	1700
KEH	Small RoPax	95.5	20.2	4.90	7900	625
KEH	Double ender	96.8	17.6	4.30	6245	610

- Sample ships are suitable examples for state-of-the-art designs
- Basic design level
 - feasible realistic design to meet business model
 - No detailed layout of structure, architectual layout, piping and ducting

Overview EMSA III Sample ships



Design variations

- For each sample ship design variations (RCOs) have been developed
- Following modifications have been applied in different combinations
 - Change of breadth and freeboard
 - Improvement of watertight subdivision
 - Different hull form
 - Buoyancy boxes on the car deck
 - Subdivided LLH
- For each RCO the change of A and costs have been calculated

Calculation assumptions

- SOLAS2009 is used as calculation base
 - Assumptions as in Explanatory Notes
 - For RoPax additional new S-wod according SLF55 calculated
 - Draught range based on loading conditions
 - A-class boundaries considered in flooding stages
- Assumptions:
 - The business model is kept constant
 - No significant change of capacity (cargo, cabins)
 - Operational profile kept the same (distance, turn around time)
 - Same methodology to calculate weight and stability
 - Simplified but realistic cost estimations
 - GM limit curve defined based on loading conditions
 - Margins to GM curve are kept constant
- No detailed internal watertight integrity considered
 - Projects are on basic design level
- Ungraded No detailed routing of pipes and ducts

Cost-Benefit Assessment

Cost Benefit Assessments for sample ships are based on:

– Investment Costs

- Building costs due to enlarged ship (steel, interior systems)
- Cost impact due to changed equipment (engines, propulsion, thrusters etc)
- Financing costs

Operational costs

- Mainly fuel costs
- Increased time in port may cause increased speed \rightarrow higher fuel costs
- Increased maintenance costs

– Revenue

- Small adjustments of income
- Reduced probability of total loss results in less costs for scrap
- All costs are calculated in Euro and converted in USD based on exchange rate of 1.35 USD/Euro
- Changes of costs to the society or industry in general due to changed probability of large accidents have not been accounted for

Fuel oil price development

Data published by EIA energy outlook have been used as basis for estimating the future

trends.



- The current prices for HFO and MGO; 600 USD/t and 900 USD/t, have been obtained using the average reported prices for 2013 and 2014 in Rotterdam using Clarkson Intelligence as a source.
- The price of LSHFO is obtained based on a 20/80 distribution of the HFO and MGO price. This is the distribution that is required in order to obtain a content of 0.5 % sulphur.
- Price of LNG is taken as 94.1% of the MGO cost. This is a standard assumption used in analysis based on the LNG supplier's standard way of pricing where it is referred to that the cost of the LNG should correspond to 80% of the use of MGO.
- The latest reduction of fuel prices (MGO 540 USD/t, HFO 300 USD/t) has not been accounted for.

Cost Effectivness

- For each ship the relation between ΔA and Δcosts created using the netCAF limits of 4Mio USD and 8Mio USD.
- This allows a simple check, if an RCO meets the criteria for cost effectiveness



Large cruise vessel – Meyer Werft & Carnival





Large cruise vessel – Meyer Werft & Carnival

- Global changes (beam, freeboard)
- Local changes (internal subdivision)

Version	Description
G2	Reference design
H4	Breadth increased by 1.0m
13	Breadth increased by 1.0m Freeboard increased by 0.8m
J1	Breadth increased by 0.6m Freeboard increased by 0.2m
K1	change internal subdivision
К2	change internal subdivision as K1 part of bulkhead deck watertight
КЗ	change internal subdivision as K1 Freeboard increased by 0.4m
L1	change internal subdivision as K1 Breadth increased by 0.2m







Large cruise vessel – Meyer Werft & Carnival



Version	G2	H4	13	J1	K1	К2	К3	L1
required index R	0.8597	0.8597	0.8597	0.8597	0.8597	0.8597	0.8597	0.8597
attained index A	0.8621	0.9087	0.9288	0.9004	0.8719	0.8777	0.8754	0.8774
Change in A	0.0000	0.0466	0.0667	0.0383	0.0098	0.0156	0.0133	0.0153

Small Cruise – Fincantieri & RCCL



Small Cruise – Fincantieri & RCCL

- Global changes (beam, freeboard)
- Local changes (internal subdivision, watertight decks)

Version	Description
00	Reference design
01	Sill increased on external weathertight aft
	doors
02	Vs.01 + Deck 3 made wathertight for comp n.2 and n.3
03	Vs.02 + Cross flooding section within DB void spaces improved adding pipes
04	Vs.03 + Two weathertight door added and a watertight door added on BK deck
05	Vs.04 + Increased Beam by 0.2m (new B=20.2m)
06	Vs.04 + Increased Beam by 0.5m (new B=20.5m)
07	Vs.06 + Increased freeboard by 0.25m
08	Vs.07 + Increased Beam by 0.5m (new B=21m)
09	Vs.04 + Increased Beam by 0.1m (new B=20.1m)



Small Cruise – Fincantieri & RCCL



Versio	Description					
n						
00	Reference design					
01	Sill increased on external					
	weathertight aft doors					
02	Vs.01 + Deck 3 made wathertight					
	for comp n.2 and n.3					
03	Vs.02 + Cross flooding section					
	within DB void spaces improved					
	adding pipes					
04	Vs.03 + Two weathertight door					
	added and a watertight door					
	added on BK deck					
05	Vs.04 + Increased Beam by 0.2m					
	(new B=20.2m)					
06	Vs.04 + Increased Beam by 0.5m					
	(new B=20.5m)					
07	Vs.06 + Increased freeboard by					
	0.25m					
08	Vs.07 + Increased Beam by 0.5m					
	(new B=21m)					
09	Vs.04 + Increased Beam by 0.1m					
	(new B=20.1m)					

Version	Ref.	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09
required index R	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978	0.6978
attained index A	0.7202	0.7263	0.7307	0.7442	0.7544	0.7944	0.8281	0.8187	0.8752	0.7789
Change in A	0.0000	0.0061	0.0105	0.0240	0.0342	0.0742	0.1079	0.0985	0.1550	0.0587

Baltic RoPax – Meyer Turku & Color Line



10 CC 1

Baltic RoPax – Meyer Turku & Color Line

 Global changes (beam, new hullform subdivided double hull on bulkhead deck)

Effect of LLH

Phase	Version	Description
	А	Reference design
Phase 1	B (Option 1)	Breadth increased by 40 cm
Phase 1	C (Option 2)	Breadth increased by 20 cm Freeboard increased by 20 cm
Phase 1	D (Option 3)	Breadth increased by 40 cm Freeboard increased by 20 cm
Phase 1	E (Option 4)	Breadth increased by 40 cm Freeboard increased by 40 cm
Phase 2	F (Option 5)	As version D (opt. 3) subdivided double hull on bulkhead deck
Phase 3	I (Option 6)	As version F (opt. 5) impact of LLH
Phase 3	J (Option 7)	As version F (opt. 5) Subdivided Car Deck
Phase 3	K2 (Option 8)	As version F (opt. 5) No Lower Hold
Phase 4	L (Option 9)	As version F (opt. 5) + 40 cm more breadth = Breadth increased by 80 cm Freeboard increased by 20 cm subdivided double hull on bulkhead deck



Baltic RoPax – Meyer Turku & Color Line



Phase	Version	Description
	А	Reference design
Phase 1	B (Option 1)	Breadth increased by 40 cm
Phase	C (Option	Breadth increased by 20 cm
1	2)	Freeboard increased by 20 cm
Phase	D (Option	Breadth increased by 40 cm
1	3)	Freeboard increased by 20 cm
Phase	E (Option	Breadth increased by 40 cm
1	4)	Freeboard increased by 40 cm
Phase 2	F (Option 5)	As version D (opt. 3) subdivided double hull on bulkhead deck
Phase	I (Option	As version F (opt. 5)
3	6)	impact of LLH
Phase	J (Option	As version F (opt. 5)
3	7)	Subdivided Car Deck
Phase	K2 (Option	As version F (opt. 5)
3	8)	No Lower Hold
Phase 4	L (Option 9)	As version F (opt. 5) + 40 cm more breadth = Breadth increased by 80 cm Freeboard increased by 20 cm subdivided double hull on bulkhead deck

Version	Α	В	С	D	E	F	I	J	K2	L
		opt 1	opt 2	opt 3	opt 4	opt 5	opt 6	opt 7	opt 8	opt 9
required	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300	0.8300
index R										
attained	0.8326	0.8703	0.8670	0.8824	0.8786	0.8997	0.8494	0,.184	0.9042	0.9152
index A _{SLF55}										
Change in A	0.0000	0.0377	0.0344	0.0498	0.0460	0.0671	0.0168	0.0858	0.0716	0.0826
Ungraded										

Mediterranean Ropax – STX-France & Stena Line/Color Line



Mediterranean Ropax – STX-France & Stena Line/Color Line

- Internal subdivion
- Subdivided car deck
- Effect of LLH

Version	Description
Initial	
design	
VO	New S Ropax (SLF55 formulation)
V1	Depth + 10cm
V12	Additional WT bulkheads below bulkhead
	deck
V21	Additional WT subdivisions above bulkhead
	deck
V13	Side casing based on V12*
V14	Increase in breadth + 20cm based on V12

 \ast studied but not found to contribute significantly to raise A



Mediterranean Ropax – STX-France & Stena Line/Color Line



Version	Description
Initial	
design	
V0	New S Ropax (SLF55 formulation)
V1	Depth + 10cm
V12	Additional WT bulkheads below bulkhead
	deck
V21	Additional WT subdivisions above bulkhead
	deck
V13	Side casing based on V12*
V14	Increase in breadth + 20cm based on V12

*studied but not found to contribute significantly to raise A

Version	reference design	1 design step	2nd design step	3rd design step	4th design step
Description		V1 - depth +10	V12 - Add bkds below BHD	V21 - Add bkds on car deck	V14 - Breadth increased
Required index R	0.7777	0.7777	0.7777	0.7777	0.7777
Attained index A	0.8398	0.8404	0.8496	0.8778	0.8718
Change in A	0.0000	0.0005	0.0097	0.0380	0.0319

Small RoPax – KEH & Stena Line





Change of freeboard

Version	Initial	RCO 1
Required index R	0.7214	0.7214
Attained index A	0.7947	0.8426
change A	0.0000	0.0479

Version	Description
Initial design	
RCO1	Raise main deck + 30 cm



Double ender ferry – KEH & Stena Line



Change of freeboard

Version	Initial RCO 1		RCO 2	
Required index R	0.7279	0.7279	0.7279	
Attained index A	0.8412	0.8601	0.8782	
change A	0.0000	0.0189	0.037	

Version	Description	
Initial		
design		
RCO1	Raise main deck + 30 cm	
RCO2	Increase Beam +40 cm	



Summary RCOs collision

- High attained index possible
- For RoPax higher cost-effective RCOs can be found
- Large difference between RoPax and cruise



Watertight doors Methodology

- Impact of open WTD calculated based on simplified collision attained index
 - Single door open
 - Multiple doors open, randomly selected
- Some RCO investigated
 - Category doors changed
 - Doors removed and replaced by additional stair cases
- Removal of doors sometime not cost effective
- Large variation of results between sample ships
- Taking into account the normal operation of WTD (normally closed, closing time 1 min.) there is no significant effect on attained index



Watertight doors Summary

- Relation between connected volume and loss of index offers a great opportunity to increase awareness on board
 - Impact on safety level visible
 - Easy method, no damage stability calculation needed
 - May be used on board existing ships



- More restrictions for smaller ships
- Difficult for ropax, as the WTD are needed to access spaces along the ship
- SDC2 decision to remove type A doors resolves much of the design problem



GROUNDING Methodology

- Direct approach used
 - Bottom and side groundings
 - 5 repititions with 10000 breaches each
 - Good approximation of A
- Internal watertight integrity not fully considered
- Explicit RCOs investigated for large cruise and mediterranean ropax only
- For remaining sample ships only recalculation of reference version and one collision RCO.





GROUNDING Large cruise vessel – Meyer Werft & Carnival

- Global changes (beam, freeboard)
- Local changes (double hull, WT decks)

Version	Description				
G2	Reference design				
G3	as G2				
3	with deck 3 made watertight as far as possible				
	Selected optimized version for collision				
К3	change internal subdivision as K1				
	Freeboard increased by 0.4m				
К4	as K3				
κ4	with deck 3 made watertight as far as possible				
	double hull				
M1	increased DB height				
	lengthened by 1 web frame				
M2	as M1				
	with deck 3 made watertight as far as possible				
I3	Breadth increased by 1.0m				
	Freeboard increased by 0.8m				



GROUNDING Large cruise vessel – Meyer Werft & Carnival

- All grounding RCOs are cost effective
- some RCO do not comply with SOLAS2009 anymore



Version	G2	G3	К3	К4	M1	M2	13
Description	reference version	as G2 with wt decks	opt. Version for collision	as K3 with wt decks	double hull increased DB height	as M1 with wt decks	Increased beam, increased freeboard
SOLAS2009	0.8626	0.8643	0.8754	0.8792	0.8529	0.8747	0.9288
A Grounding	0.9142	0.9336	0.9543	0.9551	0.9736	0.9707	0.9513

GROUNDING Mediterranean RoPax – STX-France & Stena Line/Color Line

- Internal subdivision + beam increased
- WT decks + crossflooding

Version	Description
vo	original design
	Optimized for collision: Internal
V14	subdivision +
	Breadth increased
	Cross flooding devices +
V15	watertightness of longitudinal
	bulkheads
V16	Additional watertight parts of
VIO	decks





GROUNDING Mediterranean RoPax – STX-France & Stena Line/Color Line



Version	V00	V14	V15	V16
	original design	Optimized for collision: Internal subdivision + Breadth increased	Cross flooding devices + watertightness of longitudinal bulkheads	Additional watertight parts of decks
Collision SOLAS2009 +SLF55	0.8398	0.8718	0.8717	0.880855
Mean attained index A grounding A_{GR}	0.954	0.958	0.963	0.973

GROUNDING Summary

- High index for grounding can be attained
- Direct approach is very time consuming but offers great potential to be used also for collision
- Methodology requires further validation and confirmation by IMO
- Some RCOs improve collision and grounding, other RCOs have adverse effects on collision or grounding
- Effect on detailed design and internal watertight integrity to be further analysed



Sample ships, RCOs and CBA

- Introduction and overview of the EMSA III studies (Odd Olufsen)
- Formal Safety Assessment, Risk Models for collision and grounding (Rainer Hamann)
- Methodologies for assessing risk from watertight doors and risk from grounding (Odd Olufsen)
- Sample ships; design and risk control options (Henning Luhmann)
- Summary of results, recommendations for decision making (Odd Olufsen)

Effects of taking grounding into account in the CBA

Attained Index A (collision) for Risk control Options meeting the CAF criteria with and without including the effect from grounding.



Suggested level of R if considering collision only



N is the number of persons onboard without consideration of type of LSA

Alternative when grounding is accounted for in the CBA



$$R = 1 - \frac{C1 * 6200}{4 * N + 20000} \qquad \qquad C1 = 0.8 - \frac{0.25}{10000} * (10000 - N)$$

N is the number of persons onboard without consideration of type of LSA

Conclusions

- The project does not provide any data for RoPax and passenger ships carrying less than 400 persons onboard.
- There is no data available for RoPax having more than 3280 persons onboard.
- The Cost-Effectiveness Analysis performed in the project, supports raising the level of R for collision.
- For cruise ships, a number of RCOs have been investigated on 2 sample ships. When the assessment is based on benefits from collision only, the RCOs found to be cost effective show only limited improvement. Grounding represents a significantly higher risk than collision based on the calculations carried out in the project. There is a clear trend that RCOs improving the attained index A for collision would also improve the attained index A for grounding. When grounding is included in the risk assessment the CAF values are generally reduced and additional RCOs become cost-effective.
- Suggested levels of R are shown in two different formulations. Both formulations show a significant increase of safety level for small and medium sized ships and a moderate increase for very large ships. However, accounting for the additional cost-effective RCOs deriving from consideration of grounding (as explained above), it is concluded that the formulation with the higher level of R is deemed more appropriate, following closely the FSA process and methodology. *

* Some members of the consortium have expressed their reservation wrt. use of grounding in the
Ungraded CBA before the methods and assumptions have been further tested and validated.

Discussion points

- These include recommendations by the Project Partners as a Group of Experts and as Stakeholders of the maritime/marine industry beyond the EMSA III framework.
 - For large cruise ships, there is limited amount of information/data concerning their survivability in damaged conditions due to relatively small fleet and (luckily) small number of casualties, thus not attracting research focus. The limited amount that does exist indicates that the current formulation of the s-factor in SOLAS 2009 tends to underestimate the survivability of cruise ships. This, in turn, influences ΔPLL and cost-effectiveness.
 - By contrast, there are significantly more published validation results available for damage stability of RoPax ships (s-factor) than for cruise ships, e.g., North-West European Project for Damage Stability of Ro-Ro Passenger Ships (the basis for Stockholm Agreement) and the EC-funded projects HARDER and GOALDS.
 - The results of EMSA III show that grounding is the dominant risk. It certainly represents a significantly higher risk than collision. However, further validation and testing is required in order to develop specific proposals.
 - Presentation to and familiarisation by industry outside the consortium is also recommended before suggesting requirements such as combined collision and grounding to IMO.
 - Method and software for calculation of A for collision should be developed based on the non-zonal approach as was done in the EMSA III project for grounding.

Thank you for your kind attention

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